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PRAKßTI AS SÄMÄNYA
Angelika Malinar, Tübingen
The elaboration of sämkhyistic teachings as a philosophical system seems to
have been closely related to the doctrine of (avyakta) pralqti or pradhdna,
of a singular causal realm. This stands in contrast to pre-SK texts, in which
evolutionary processes are described by assuming a plurality of creative
powers, i.e. seven or eight pralqti.t It is this singular cause, which
manifests the visible world through self-transformation Qtarinama) and
aggregation (samghata) of its three "subtle powers", the guna.2 A corollary
of this assertion is the thesis that agency and causal capacity are in pratqti
alone. Therefore, causality is self-organized and does not need the
productive interference of a conscious entity.3 That the interpretation of
pralvti as a singular cause in kirika-Sämkhya implied changes in the
Cf. JonNsroN (1937: 25 ff .) for references. In SK the earlier concept of plural pralc.rti
reappears in the seven so-called pralcrti-vilrrti-tattva.In the YS und YBh, pralvti is
frequently used in plural, whereas the singular causal realm is often designated as
pradhana (YS I .45;2.19;2.23: 3.18:' 3.47 cum YBh for pradhana compared with
YS l.19 and 1.51 for pralcrti in singular; and YS 3.25;3.44;3.47: 4.2-3 for pralcrti in
plural).
This rendering of "guqa" as "subtle powers" (süksmah iahayah) is based on the
interpretation given in YD (for example ad SK 9, p. 109, 15-1,7; ad SK 16, p. 164,27-
28). This interpretation takes into account one specific feature of the satkärya-doctrine
which will be relevant in the following discussion: The presence of an existent creative
potential, which might or might not be manifest, i.e. be fransformed into an effect. The
equation of guna with iaki does, however, not solve the problem, how the
relationship between pradhdna and the three gunas has to be understood. This
problem becomes obvious in the discussions on the implications of translating guna as
"constituent" (as advocated by Genss 1917: 273) or "quality" respectively (as
preferred by Jncoet 1895 in his critique of Gnnnn). FRArJwALrxrn (1953: 306,
passim; 1992:107) sticks to "quality" (as do HACKER 1985 and RAO 1963). LARSoN
( 1987: 65 ff.) proposes to interpret the guna along the lines of "reductive materialism"
which according to him constitutes the core-doctrine of Sämkhya. Thus, he translates
triguna as "tripartite constituent process [...] which is primordial materiality."
It does however need the teleological relation to the purusa, which provides activity
with a purpose. This relation is not presented as a variation of "causality", i.e. as the
causa finalis, but as a predisposition of avyaha-pralvti: In the YD this predisposition
is called adhikdra. Vide infra.
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position of the conscious entity can be corroborated by early usages of
plural pralvti: The doctrine of a plurality of pralvti or self-acting causes is
often combined with the presence of an acting (i.e. causally efficient)
consciousness, which provides the activity of those causes with liveliness,
order and purpose. Thus, in BhG 7.4 the "eightfold pralvti" (astqdha
pralcrti) is dependent on Kf$la, who directs her as the entering jlva.
Similarly, an active function is ascribed to the purusa in some passages of
the Carakasamhitä.4 The development of the doctrine of prakrti as a
singular cause seems to go along with opposing her to the non-acting
purusa. Moreover, as far as it can be reconstructed from the available
textual sources, the necessity of such a singular and common cause had to
be proved from the very start. Therefore, the Sämkhya-teachers offered a
theoretical construction of the term as well as of the entity "pralcrti". In
doing this, they used certain techniques of inference (anumana) as all
philosophical schools arguing for "invisible entities" (as e.g. the atman)
did. However, in asserting a singular cause, which acts independently from
self-reflective intentionality but is nevertheless receptive to its presence,
they had a hard time in the debates with the other philosophical schools,
which rejected the whole concept.s
The analysis of the conceptualization of pralvti may thus help to assess
the philosophical intentions as well as the value of the construction of the
term for the systematic coherence of Sämkhya. It might also shed some
light on the attractiveness the concept had not only in systematic
presentations of Yoga teachings, but also in theological contexts. Such an
analysis can be undertaken by scrutinizing the available texts not only for
the proofs for pralvti but also for those terms, which serve to define or
specify the concept under consideration. In the following I shall deal with
samdnya (general, common) as one of those terms of specification and
point to two contexts, in which the term is used. In these contexts the term
serves to define pralvti (1) as opposed to purusa and (2) as the cause
(avyakta) vis-ä-vis her products (vyakta). Although sdmdnya and the
opposite term vi.fesa do not play the prominent role as particular categories
+ For the juxtaposition of VaiSesika- and Sämkhya-interpretations of purusq or dtman in
Carakasaryhitä compare CoNme ( I 978).
s Cf. KurraeR (1983) for a survey of the refutations of Sämkhya in what he calls the
"brahmanical systems"; for Sankara's refutation see PoDcoRSKr (1975) and LansoN
(1979:209-235). For the refutation in Tattvasamgraha compare LtpssMHAL (1934).
as for example in VaiSesika, both qualifications are relevant also in
Sä1nkhya. This holds especially true for the second context, when the terms
are employed for describing causality and thus for specifying satkaryavada.
Evidence for this can be furnished from YD, YBh, and a text outside the
Sä4khya tradition, in Simhasüri's commentary on Mallavädin's doxo-
graphy (DvädaSäranayacakra), the Nyäyägamänusärini (Nyäg).
l. Avyakta andvyakta as samanya
The term samanya is in SK employed, when pradhana and the manifest
world are both opposed to the purusa. This qualification appears in SK I I
and is thus part of a set of attributes, which are called sarüpa, e.g. which
describe the characteristics avyaha-pralcrti shares with her products. These
stand in contrast to the so-called vtrüpa-attributes in SK 10, which
distinguish pralcrti from her products.6 These virüpa-characteristics imply
that pralvli shares certain characteristics with the purusa. One consequence
of this distribution is, that the three objects of knowledge enumerated in
SK 2 (vyakta, avyakta and jfia) are defined as embedded in a triadic frame
of reference. Therefore, the purusa for example is opposed to pralcrti only
with regard to those aspects, which the pralcrli shares with her products.
Most commentaries explain "sämänya" as that which is common to all
purusas (sometimes sadhqrana is used as synonym). As examples serve an
actress or a female slave, who might be looked at or used by many purusas,
or at least by all purusas around.T Thereby it is asserted, that the purusa is
6 hetumad anityam avyapi sakriyam aneknm qiritam lingam I
sdvayavam paratantrarp vyaktary viparitam avyaktam //SK l0/
trigunam qviveki vi;ayaft sdmdnyam acetanam prasavadharmi I
vyaktant tatha pradhanam tadviparitas tathd ca pumdn llSK lll
On the function of this distribution of attributes in the context of SK 9-15 cf.
Mar-rNnn 1998: 116-127. On sarupya and vairupya as qualifications of hetu in the
context of yuktivada compare OggRHAN4N,ßn (1963: 82).
7 Compare ad SK I l:
for the female slave: SSV (p.21,26-27). sdmdnyam vyaham sarvapurusdndm, yatha
malladast sarvve;dm eva malldndm I sdmanyavisayatvad vyaktary sarvvapurusanam,
sdmdnyam tatha pradhanam api visayatvat sarvapurusasdmdnyam / (similarly: SV,
p. 17,9-10; JM p. 14,16-17: sdmdnyam vyalctam, sarvapurusopabhogyatvan
malladastvat I tatha pradhdnam api; GBh, p. l3,l: sdmdnyam vyaktam I
müly adas tv at s arv as ddhar anatv at)
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always entangled in a structure, which is the same for every self-deceived
consciousness. Thus, the material and the basic formations of the cognitive
and physical apparatus are identical for all manifest beings, which become
objects (vi;aya) of purusa. Consciousness incites the production of general
formations, but has no influence for example on the sequence, in which
these formations appear, e.g. that buddhi always appears before ahamkörq
and not vice versa. Thus, pralc.rti is a cause, which not only produces a
variety of things and their material basis, but also provides the assembly of
manifest things with orderliness, homogenity, predictability and
repeatability. Even Yogins, when they gain access to the natural powers
(aiivarya), seem to be restricted by these präkrtic predispositions. They can
open the creative channels of pralvti,E but they are not reported to have
created their private universe.
Avyakta-pral{rti is able to react to various degrees of karmic delusion
by a mechanism, which is not explained by the Sämkhya teachers. At least
the YD testif,res that one realized the problems, which this lack of
explanation might provoke. Thus, the commentator states that the
performance offered by pralvti is happening according to "adhiknra", i.e.
resulting from authonzation or duty respectively.e The first appearance of
guna-configurations resulting in the manifestation of buddhi happens
for the actress-dancer: STK (p. 108,3-5): samanyam sadhdranam. vijfianarupatve tv
asadharanyad vijfianam vrttirupandm te 'py asddharanah syuh. tatha ca
nartaktbhrulatabhanga ekssmin bahünam pratisamdhdnam Wktarft anyatha tan na
syad iti bhavah.
for a courtesan: MV (p.20,6-7): sdmanyam vyaham I ganikivat sarvapurusanam I
tatha pradhanam api /
8 As described in YS 4.2-3 withYBh. In this passage pralcyti is used in plural.
e On adhiköra see LentvlEnr (1988) and Het-eress (1991 66-74). Adhiknra is
especially referred to in YD ad SK 2l and 52. The term is also used in YBh ad YS
1.5, 1.50, 5l;2.24 and 3.55, where it is ascribed to the gula and the citta or buddhi
respectively. Adhikära is preferably used, when the binding activity of the guna is
described, thus the adhiköra of the guna and the citta consists in entangling the
purusa, whereas the practice of Yoga results in dispositions, which obstruct the
performance of adhikara. Correspondingly, deliverance means the end of adhiknra.
-Cf. for example the contrast between "buddhi with adhikära" (sadhikära), which
"comes bacK', and buddhi, which gained knowledge of purusa and does not return as
theadhikäraisgone. (caritadhilara;cf. YBh ad YS 2.24;pp.233-234). See also the
definition of knivalya as the termination of the (fixed) sequence (of transformation of
the guna) according to their adhiknra (YSBh ad YS 4.34, p. 454 gunadhikfrrqkrama'
s am dp t au ka iv a ly am uktam).
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according to this "adhikära".r0 Even the association (samyoga) of purusa
and pralvri is due to adhikara as the YD-kära explains in commenting on
the mutual dependence between the two spheres (samyogam adhikara-
bandham ahur acaryah; YD ad SK 21, p. 185,3-4). The production and
reproduction of the elements and the matrices of corporal existence, which
are common to all purusas, thus seems to be ascribed to prakrti's own
creative potential, which is, to a certain degree, self-organized. lt is stated,
that the gutja are not dependent on the purusa with regard to the manner, in
which they fulfill their duty. Correspondingly, it is maintained, that the
manifestation of tattva is a process, which follows a fixed course or
sequence (krama)ll and depends solely on the very "being" of creative
powers, the guna.'t This is corroborated in YBh ad YS 4.3, where it is
stated that the success of Yoga-practice is not the cause for the incitement
of the natural powers (prakrti, pl.). Yogic practice can only remove the
barriers, which withheld pralvti from acting, it can not influence the
structure of her activity, because an effect cannot "cause" the activity of the
cause.t3
t0 Thus, it is declared in the context of explaining the mutual dependency between linga
and bhava: gunasqmanantaram tv adhikdralal<sanah I tasmad dvividha sargo
'dhiköralal<sano <lingakhyo> bhdvakhyas ca I (YD ad SK 52, p. 255,20-21). In
employing this term, the YD-kära refers to a discussion among Sär.nkhya teachers
about the status of bhava (as disposition of buddhi) and adhiköra with regard to
creation (sarga).
I I The lvama of the guna is also referred to in YS and YBh in descriptions of parindma
(YS 3.15 with YBh) and of cosmology (cf. YS 2.19 with YBh). In YBh ad 2.19 it is
stated that the "vertical", i.e. hierarchical, division of the guna is dependent on the "rule
of the sequence of fansformation" Qtarinamakramaniyamat). This "lcama" can not
be transgressed (cf. YBhVi ad2.l9, p. 188, 12-13: lcramanatipatteh is explained as
kramdnatikramdt, and then it is stated: nc hi loke knsyacid utpadyamanasya
kramatilanghanam asli (For in this world nothing, that comes into being, can
transgress the fixed sequence [of origination]).
rz "The manifest is only a specific formation of those (subtle powers), which in fufilling
their task operate through (self-) transformation as they form aggregates, whose
appearance follows a (fixed) sequence, which is determined only by the very being of
(those powers)." (tasam adhikörasamarthyad upajdtaparinamavyapdrdndm san-
mdtrdnukramena pracaydm upasampadyamdndndm sanniveiaviiesamdtram
vyaktam, YD ad SK 9, p. 109,17-19).
13 na hi dharmddi nimittam prayojakntp pralvtinam bhavati, na kärryena karanam
pravarttyate, kathan tarhi 
- 
varanabhedas tu tatah ksetrikavad (YBh ad YS 4.3,
p. 395).
ry
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The independence from the causal chain allows for the purusa's
singularity. When opposed to sdmdnya as the sarüpa-attribute of prakyti and
her products, the puruso is qualified as asdmanya or nihsamanya.ro The
commentators seem to have been careful not to qualify him as "viSesa";
perhaps in order to make sure, that he is not part of any causal relationship
and is thus never identical with anything except himself. Conversely, to
maintain individuality or distinctness in a realm which is "common"
(samanya) to all purusa is only a sign of ignorance and error. Although
individual beings (bheda) appear as a result of the specific delusion of
purusa with regardto pralvti, there exist no absolute distinct beings, which
might be comparable to VaiSesika's atyanta-vi1esa. Rather, the individuality
of manifest things documents according to Sämkhya their dependency on
the common cause. All specifications are relative. They appear and
disappear, but never affect the "distinct" purusas.
This line of argument is touched upon in the YD in a passage, in
which the individuality of effects is contrasted with the "distinctness" of
purusa.In the explanation of the last of the five reasons (hetu) for proving
the satkarya-doctrine given in SK 9 (pp. 124-125), the opponent asks why
the purusa should exist although there is no cause for him, whereas the
"hare's horn" should not exist, although there is no cause neither. In this
argument the opponent tries to equate "existence" with "being part of a
causal relationship", i.e. with being either cause or effect. With this thesis
the very possibility of a purusa as defined in Sämkhya philosophy, i.e. as
being neither cause nor effect, is rejected. Ttre author of the YD refutes this
definition of "existence" as "causal". In this connection, the causal
relationship is defined by using the terms sdmdnya and viiesa. The "effect"
is defined as samsthanaviiesa, as a special formation or aggregation of the
causal powers. This expression is used besides sanniveiaviiesats in YD and
also in YBh instead of the term samghata found in SK 16.16
14 SSV and SV ad SK l2 give "nillsämänyah", JM, GBh and MV "asämänyah".
15 Cf. YBh ad YS 4.13, which quotes the following definition: sarvam idam gunanam
sannivefaviiesamdtram iti. Samsthanavifesa is used in YBh ad YS 1.43 besides
pracayaviiesa. While the latter compound is used for describing visible and specified
things (as cow, pot) as being "special agglomerations of atoms" (anupracaya-
viiesatma gavadir ghatddir va loknh), the "special formation" of the elemental subtles
(bhütasül<sma, i.e. the subtle matrices of the elements), which preceeds the appearance
of visible things is called samsthdnaviiesa. Samsthana appears again in a quotation in
YBh ad YS 3.13. In this passages it is maintained that the "configuration" is finite,
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What is relevant in the present discussion is the statement that the
purusa is existent, although he is not an effect, because he exists apart from
the causal relationship, i.e. he is no samdnyaviiesa (samanya-vtiesabhavat).
Although there are strong indications, that VaiSesika terminologyrT is
commented upon while using sdmdnya and viiesa for qualifying the causal
relationship, in the present context it is not the absence of the VaiSesika-
category of samanyavi1esa which is referred to. Rather, a "tatpurusa"-
interpretation of the compound is suggested: The purusa is not an effect
because he is not a "specification of samanya", he is no samsthana. This
latter interpretation is based on following definition of samsthdna: "For,
formation is when the general takes a specific form" (samanyasya hi
visesaparigrahah samsthanaffi, p. 125,2-3). According to satkdryavdda,
causality is the manifestation of the cause as the effect.ls In the passage
while its constituents are not (samsthanam ddimad dharmamatram labdadtnarT
vinaiyavindSinam, evaryr lingam adimad dharmamdtram sattvadlnam vinaSy-
avinafinam tasmin viknrasamjfieri). This statement is also cited in Nyäg 323,12-13 in
the Sämkhya refutation of the thesis of the opponent, that because the effects can be
desffoyed, the cause has also to be regarded as destructible.
16 On the conceptual implications and the historical background of this terminology
compare WEZLER (1985).
l'/ Cf. MoTEGT (1994) for other VaiSesika concepts referred to in YD. The VaiSesika
concept of samanya seems also to have been commented upon indirectly in YD ad SK
I5, in the explanation of the hetu"santarlaya":"Here it is known that being(-ness) [of
an entityl, by which the different things are pervaded. As the clay [pervades] the pots
etc. Similarly, words etc. are pervaded by happiness, pain and confusion. Therefore,
they do also exist. And when these, happiness etc., have lost their specification, that is
the unmanifest. Therefore the unmanifest exists." (iha yena bheddnam samanugatis
tasya sattvat.n df$la\n tadyatha mydd ghaladinam I asti ceyam sukhaduhkhamohaih
Sabdadtnatn samanugatih I tasmdt te 'pi santi I ye ca sukhadayo 'stamitaviiesas tad
avyaktam I tasmad asty avyaham I YD ad SK L5, p. 144,1-3). This comes close to
PraSastapäda's definition of sdmanya in PDhS: yad anugatam asti tat samdnyam iti
([361], p. 81). The highest samdnya is sattd, the being-ness. As samanya constitutes
the "own form" (svarupa) of things, it arouses the same recognition
(anuvrttipratyaya).In the case of sattd, it is the recognition "sad, sad'. For a detailed
analysis of these concepts see HetsrASS (1992: 139-168). Cf. also NBh ad NyS
2.2.69. This connection between sdmdnya and its dependence on a corresponding
perception or recognition is also stressed in the explanation of dharmisvarüpa in YD
ad SK 16. Vide infra2.l.
18 Cf. the refutation of the interpretation of satknrya as a "container-docffine" in YD ad
SK 9 (l 15,18-22): The effect is not contained in the cause like the fruits of the cotton-
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under discussion this is transposed into the samanya-viiesa terminology and
thus causality might be defined as "specification of the general" or the
"specific formation of the common elements or matrices" respectively.
In proposing both formulations the implications of translating
"samdnya" with either "general" or "common" shall be pointed out as well
as the necessity to retain both translations as possible interpretations in the
different contexts of Sämkhya teachings. Samanya as the "general" (das
Allgemeine) corresponds rather to the status of pralcrti as a singular,
homogenous causal realm, as the potentiality and the structure of a
diversity, which has not yet taken shape. With regard to the function of
pralqti as a special mode of being of the causal powers, this would mean,
that the common cause would not only exist as the potentiality of manifold
configurations, i.e. specifications, but would also provide their appearance
with a certain order, with what is for example called in YBh and YD
krama. The process of entering into or of changing "configuration" is then
to be connected with the parinama-model of causality. The translation
"common" (das Gemeinsame) would indicate something more graspable, as
for example the gulta, the causal powers, which are cofirmon to all manifest
things, when they interact with each other in a relationship based on
dominance and then become manifest as sazsthdnaviiesa. This implies that
the "common" elements, which appear as "specified" when they enter into a
certain constellation, are still detectable, even if one element is dominated
by another. This interpretation would correspond to the samghata-model of
causality. Both levels of interpretation mark aspects of the usage of the
qualification "samdnye". They can be connected with the two modes of
causality, which are employed for explaining the activity of pralcrti. Both
can be used to assert the continuity between cause and effect as well as a
difference between them, i.e. the "general" appears as specified and the
"common" as individualized. In addition to this, it is also helpful to
consider both interpretations, when sdmanya serves for connecting the
singularity of prakrfi, as the "state of non-difference", with the plurality of
her causal powers, which remain present as the "common" efficiency in all
manifest things.
shrub are contained in a jar. Rather: The effect is just the cause (käranam eva karyam
ity anumanydmahe).
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The freedom from this causal bondage distinguishes the purusa from
the pralvti realm. In this realm viiesa is def,rned in relation to samanya.
Therefore, the sämkhyistic purusa can not be a vlsesa in this sense. Thus,
his distinctness has to be seen as numerical distinctness in the first place.
Before the second context is dealt with, is should again be emphasized, that
the application of samanya and viiesa in describing causality, makes it
possible to interpret satkdryavada in terms of "differenciation" or
"specification of a general". This function seems to be specific for the
sämkhyistic interpretation of samanya. Moreover, it seems to be closely
related (1) to the causal hierarchy implied in the tattva scheme and (2) to
the proofs for prakrtt.
2. Samanya and viSesa as "internal" qualifications in the realm of pralcrti-
tattva
In what has been called the "second context", samdnya is used in order to
distinguish pralvti as the common cause from the variety of her products.
The samanya-viSesa terminology is employed in order to describe causal
relationships in the tatna-scheme, which is characterised by hierarchical or
vertical sequence as well as by horizontal arrangement.re
It seems, that for the Sämkhya teachers this usage stood in no conflict
with qualifying both avyaha @rafuti) and the vyakta-realm as samanya,
when opposed to the purusa. This indicates, that causality and the structure
of the pralvti-cosmos were, to a certain extent, explained independently
from the existence of the purusa. Not only that: Seen from the angle of
proving the "objects of knowledge" in Sämkhya, one might even say, that
the purusa is a derivate of the pralvti realm. The unity of the cosmos
constitutedby pralvri implies those general features, which serve as hetus
for or provide the basis for inferin g purusa in SK 17.20
19 For the distinction between "horizontal" and "vertical" cosmology cf. HRrsFess
(1992:54-56).
20 Thus, it is not a matter of chance, that in SK the hetu for infeing purusa are listed after
the enumeration of the hetu for the satkarya-thesis and for pralvti. Rather, this
arrangement shows, that lSvarakrsrla aimed at some systematic plausibility in his
presentation of Samkhya. Cf. MerrNen (1998: lll-127).
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2.1 Samanya and viiesa in descriptions of causal hierarchy
Both terms are used for describing evolutionary and involutionary processes
in the context of what might be called "causal hierarchy".2r one of the
special features of the satkdrya-doctrine is the thesis, that pralvti, apart
from her being the "highest" cause, is present in the effects as their very
efficiency. This holds true firstly, for the productivity of the tattva,
especially the so-called"pralvti-vilvtayaft", which are capable of producing
"other tattva" (tatnantara). Secondly, this can be observed in the realm of
vikdra, the world of individualised, manifest entities: although they cannot
produce other, i.e. new tattva, they can reproduce themselves according to
genera and species and thus testify that they belong to prakrti." In SK this
employment is hinted at in karika 38, when the terms "eviiesa" and "viiese"
are used for distinguishing the "non-specified elements" (tanmdtra) from
the "specified" elements (mahabhüta). Most commentators explain the
appearance of the gross elements as "differenciation" of the "non-specified
elements". This differenciation implies not only the transformation of the
tanmatra into the respective mahabhüta, but also a successive accumulation
of qualities in the manifest elements.
This description can be interpreted as an attempt to combine two
modes of causality, i.e. parindma and samghata. A sequence, and as such a
transformation Qtarindma) of tanmatra is indicated, when it is declared,
that e.g. akaSa results from Sabda-tanmdtra. Addition or conglomeration
(samghata) takes place, when the next mahabhüta (tejas), which arises
from the rüpatanmatra, has also the quality (here called gutta) of the
iabda-tanmdtra.23
2r Cf. YD ad SK 3, p. 65, 12 or YBh ad YS 2.19, p.2ll. This distinction between
prakrti-vilvtayah-tatna and viköra-tattva will be dealt with in an article under
preparation.
22 For this see 2.2.
23 CnarnaveRt (1975:244) summarizes this theory, which is attested in YD, YBh and
its sub-commentaries as follows: "[...] everywhere it is found that a gross element
inherits the respective property or properties of the tanmätra from which it evolves and
that one tanmätra independent of another tanmäha gives rise to a gross element." The
systematic difficulties, which arise from this combination are pointed out by
Cnexnavenrt (ibid.: 245 fT.) and BRoNrsoRSr (1994: 312-315). 
- 
Värsaganya
postulates a special V,tnd (bhava) of "sambandha" between tanmdtra and mahabhüta,
the "mdtra-mdtrika-bhdva". Cf. FRALJwALLI.IER (1958: 45-4$. For different
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Subsequently, the mahabhüta (or rather their qualities), once manifest,
interact with each other according to the principle of sanniveiavisesa or
samghdta. They are not capable of "productive" transformation into another
tattva, but change only Qtarinama) with regard to the constellation of their
qualities. If one asks, however, what is interacting with what, and what
remains constant in these interactions, so that the elements entering
"configuration" remain identifiable, in short, how can change be mediated
with stable configurations, some difficulties arise for the interpreters. It
seems, that the above-mentioned combination of two models of causality is
one reason for the difficulties, which arise, especially in interpreting the
relationship between dharmin and dharmc, substratum and qualities.2o The
mahqbhüta as vikira (modification) of the preceding tatna (the tanmatra)
remain stable, they serve, for the time being, as dharmin, while the
configuration of their qualities, which interact with the qualities of the
other elements, might change. Nevertheless, the stability of the elements as
vikdra does not imply, that they exist as substances apart from their
qualities. This has already been pointed out by WYzTER in his interpretation
of the statement "gunesemdravo dravyam" in the context of Sämkhya:
According to him, the individual material object (dravya) "is [...] defined
to be always, i.e. at each and every point of time, nothing but a gurla-
samdrdva, no matter which qualities 'come together' to constifute it at a
particular point of time. The fact that the gunas change, or even
peffnanently change, does not in the least affect the nature of the dravya as
such, i.e. its being nothing but a samdrdva of gunas at every moment of its
- 
finite 
- 
existence." (1985: 18). However, the identity of the dravya, or to
be more precise, the stability of the configuration of their qualities, has also
to be accounted for. This is suggested by BnoNrgoRST, who explains the
co-existence of satkarya-doctrine and samghata-model as the result of a
historical development: "In order to accommodate the doctrine of
satkarvavdda, classical Sänkhya views the world as a continuous series of
interpretationsofthe manifestation of the mahabhütas see YD (ad SK 22,p. 187; ad
38,p.225).
24 The often quoted point of reference for the problem and its interpretation is the
definition of parinamc given in YD ad SK 9 (p. 1ll,2l-22) and 16 (p. 163,12-13):
jahad dharmdntaram pürvam upadatte yada param I
tattvad apracwto dharml parinamah sa ucyate ll
(When a substratum takes up a diflerent quality after abandoning a former quality
without loosing its identity, this is called transformation.).
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modifications Qtarinama) of substrates which do not lose their essence."(1994:316). Yet, how can one describe this "substantialist" aspect of
Sämkhya, without revoking the sämkhyistic rejection of the scheme of
substance and accidens of Vai6esika? Or put it otherwise: How can one
account for the limitation of possible changes of a dravya, i.e. the stability
of a manifest configuration? A consideration of the samanya-viiesa
terminology, which is employed for describing causal relationships in the
hierarchy of tattva might offer some additional perspective on the problem.
In the YD this hierarchy is referred to in the commentary ad SK 16, in
the context of a discussion of the above-mentioned definition of
parinama.t5 The opponent rejects the definition with the argument, that one
cannot speak of an essential form (i.e. the identity) of a substratum
(dharmisvarüpa), if Sämkhya (1) holds the dharml not to be different from
the qualities (dharma), and (2) teaches the appearance and disappearance of
dharma.26 Moreover, the alleg ed dharmisvarüpa can not be conceived of as
neither samanya nor vrsesa. With regard to this objection, the YD-kära
states, that the dharmisvarüpa should be regarded as samanya. This
statement is in the following explained by proposing an epistemological
perspective, which connects this position with the definition of sdmdnya rn
NBh as well as in PDhS27: Samanya has to be regarded as existent as long
as the idea or perception Q)ratyaya) of it remains, i.e. it is perceived as that
which remains constant while changes occur with regard to the dharma-
configuration. In this way, the question of an ontological continuity of the
substratum as samanya (as the common "thing") with regard to the
hierarchy of causal realms is brushed aside. Instead, an ontological
relativism is postulated, which is based on the epistemological conditions
pointed out before. The commentator explains:
If, however, it is declared, that the general (samanya) is with reference to another
general a specification, than we reply: It is not so, because sdmdnya remains
25 See above note24.
26 YD ad SK 16, p. 163,28-31.
27 Vätsyäyana states in his comment on the NyS-definition of jati as that which produces
the same, that samanya is that "thing" @rtha) which is operative in producing the
same perception or idea with regard to different objects {go 'rtho 'nekatra
pratyaydnuvrttinimittam tat sdmdnyam; NBh ad NyS 2.2.69, 693,3.). For a
parallelism to PDhS and YD see above note 17.
present as long as the idea28 of it is not abandoned and therefore the 'own form' of
the substratum is ascertained. As long as this idea 'earth' does not vanish the
general is the earth, the specification is the pot etc. Thus, that [the earth] is the
substratum, because the existence of [her] own form is ascertained from the arising
of the idea of a form with regard to that [object], while other qualities come and go;
the pots etc. are the qualities. When, however, the idea of "ealth" vanishes, then the
element-matrices are the general and being a substratum flike earth has been before]
is a specific quality 
- fin this way] it is to be explained up to pradhana. This
lpradhana), however, is indeed permanent, because another general is not obtained.
When all specifications are absent, that is pradhana. If, however, earth etc. were
always undifferenciated, thus existing in the form of the general, they would also
attain permanency. Therefore, the essential form of a subsffatum is not non-existent.
And [an 'own form' is accepted] also because capacity (causal power) is accepted
as general. Likewise the causal powers 'happiness, pain and confusion' indeed
ffansform themselves into the subtle body, starting with 'great' (mahat, i.e. the
buddhi), ending with the elements. And they are substrata because they
continuously cause common ideas [or the idea of a general], as ![ey do not deviate
from their essential form; and the subtle body is the qualification."
Pradhana is here interpreted as the only permanent samanya, while in
the causal hierarchy of tattva, the respective cause is seen as the general
with regard to its effect, which is treated as its specificatron. Sdman))a as
the preceeding state of the cause is present in the effect as its svarüpa. As
such it is, however, embedded in the hierarchy of causal relationships and
therefore finite and relative. The perception and idea of samdnya or
svarüpa vanish, when a higher level in the causal hierarchy is reached. In
28 Pratyaya seems to imply more than mere attention (alocanc) as it signifies the
perception of something as something, thus a perception accompanied by verbalization
or conceptualization (savikalpa). Therefore, the term is translated with "idea".
29 yat tüham (...) samanyam sdmdnyantarapel<sam vilesaMam iti <atra brümah:> na
pratyay<d>nivrttau samany<a>bhavavasthites tatai ca dharmisvarüpasiddheh I
yavat prthivlty ayom pratyayo na nivartate tdvat prthivt sdmdnyam ghatadir vi|esah
<dravyatvarp> cdsau dharmantaraparivarte;u tadaknrapratyayotpattitah sva-
rüpavasthdnasiddher dharma ghaladayaft I yada tu prthivlpratyayanivrttis tada
tanmatranam sdmdnyabhavo dravyatvam ca viieso dharma iti yavat pradhanam I
tasya tu sdmanyantardnupapatteh knutasthyam evo I yatra sarvaviiesdbhavas tat
pradhanam I yadi tu prthivyadtnam nityam avydvrttam syat samanyarupam evam sati
kautasthyam e;arp praptam I tasmdn na dharmisvarüpabhavah I lakter va sdmdnya-
bhavabhyupagamdt I athava sukhaduhkhamohaiaktaya eveha mahadadina
visesdntena liigena parindmam pratipadyante I tasam ca satatam sdmanvapratyaya-
nimittatvat svarüpad apracyuter dravyatvam lingasya <ca> dharmatvam / (YD ad
sK 16.164.17-30).
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this way the dharma-dharmin-terminology is transposed into the tattva-
scheme and reinterpreted along the lines of a sequence of specifications of
the (preceeding) general or common element. The "substratum" is defined
and perceived according to its rank in the tattva-scheme and is thus relative
although it functions as svarüpa with regard to the specific configuration of
its attributes. At the same time it seems to be responsible for the stability of
a specific configuration of qualities.
Further light is shed on this relationship in those passages in the YBh,
in which causal hierarchy and, along with this, the scheme of tutna is
explained. However, while on the hand the relevance of the terminology
under consideration can be corroborated, on the other hand, one has to be
aware of the differences between the two texts with regard to the
interpretation of Sämkhya. Reasons for this can be sought in the different
scholastic context of both texts and in different intentions. While in YBh
Sämkhya is used quite selectively, the YD aims at an exposition of the
whole system as it is presented in SK. Also, different scholastic affiliations(i.e. guru-committment) have to be taken into account, although they have
to remain uncertain for the time being. This might explain some differences
in the interpretation of the tattva-scheme and the respective tattva, which
distinguish the Sämkhya presented in the YBh from karikn-Samkhya (as for
example the reference to paramanu as parts of the tanmdtra in YBh ad YS
3.43). In YS 2.19 the transformation of the gurya is divided into the
following stages (ascending): visesa, avisesa, lingamdtra, alinga.3o The
YBh explains, that the transformation into specifications (viiesaparinama)
implies 16 vifesa: The five bhütani and the lI indriya (together with the
manas). These proceed from the group called "sadaviiesa" (fle tanmatra
and the asmitalaksanalsyal avisesalsya]). These aviiesas are again
transformations of the "sattamatrasya dtmano mahata.s" (the mighty self,
which is mere being), which is dependent on pradhana, the alinga (without
characteristics). As such it is exempt from all ontological specifications (it
is called being neither sad nor asad). At the end of this explanation it is
stated, that there are no other tattva beyond, or rather below, the group of
viSesa, i.e. the gross elements. Modification or change Qtarinama) in their
case does not result in "self-transformation" of cosmic, i.e. general
relevance: They are only affected by changes with regard to dharma
(qualities), lakana (characteristics) and avastha (state), which is the subject
30 viielaviiesaliigamatralingani gunaparvdni llYS 2.191
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of YS 3.13.' ' Thus, in YBh parinama is not the same for all tatn)a, but is
defined according to the position of the respective tattva in the causal
hierarchy. The introduction of the forms of parinama in YS 3.13 thus also
indicates the necessity to restrict tattvdntara-parinama. Only this restriction
allows for presenting a completed tattva scheme, i.e. a cosmos, which is not
open to further or even open-ended evolution.
This scheme as well as the sequence (lvama) of the modification of the
gufta is further specified in a description of the conquest of the elements
(bhütajaya) ad YS 3.44. The sütra states that this conquest can be achieved
through "semyama" of the following five aspects (YBh calls them "rüpt")
of the bhüta: sthüla, svarüpa, sül<sma, anvaya,, qrthavattva. In the context
of the present discussion, the first three aspects are especially relevant. The
commentator explains, that the gross (sthüla) form of the elements consists
in the specifications, which belong to the elements together with their
qualities as form [etc.] Qtarthivadyah iabdadayo viiesah sahakaradibhir
dharmaih).32 In contrast to this, the svarüpa-form is explained as
"sdmdnyem", i.e. as that, which remains constant in the changing
configurations of the qualities of the elements (as1ta samanyasya iabdadayo
viiesah). These are: shape (mürti) for earth; viscidity (sneha) for water;
heat (usnata) for fire; bending Qtranam) for wind and omnipresence
(sarvatogati) for aether.33 These samanya are regarded as the jati, so that
different configurations arise only with regard to the qualities. Before the
author of the YBh proceeds with the explanation of the sül<sma-aspect, the
subtle form (i.e. the tanmatra as causes of the mahabhüta) he describes the
structure of a dravya, in this case apparently, the concrete, perceptible
thing. It is stated, that a dravya is an aggregate of sdmdnya and viSeso
(samanyavisesasamudayo 'tre dravyam). After the commentator has
distinguished between different "aggregates" or configurations, he quotes a
definition of Patafljali, that a dravya is an aggregate, whose parts are not
3l It is süated, that this parinama does not affect the svarupa of the dharmin, which is
called the svarupa of the mahabhüta (e.g. mürti in case of the earth; cf. YBh ad 3.44
and 4.14). Cf. YBh ad YS 3.13: ete dharmalal<sandvasthaparinamd dharmisva-
rüpam anatikranta ity... (p.307).
32 The latter qualites are also mentioned in YD ad SK 38, where, however, a svarüpa of
the mshabhüta is not mentioned. Only a list of qualities is given, which also appears
in TV ad YBh 3.44. These qualities, according to the YD-kära, support each other
mutually Qt ar as p ar dnu gr a hakah, p. 225,22).
33 Cf. the list in YBh ad YS 4.14, with a slightly different terminology.
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separable from each other.3a This inseparability is the reason for the
stability, the essential form (svarüpa) of the dravya. The author of the YBh
does not explain, how the first definition of the svarupa of the elements is
connected with the explanation "samanyavisesasamudaya". Nevertheless.
one can at least try to interprete the description, if one again takes into
account (l) the causal hierarchy and (2) the necessity to give an explanation
for the stability of a specific configuration of qualities.
First of all, the description in YBh shows, that the application of the
samanya-viSesa-terminology is bound to the respective subdivision Qtarttan)
of the transformation of the gufia and can as such be repeated at each stage.
The other specific feature of the employment of this terminology is, that
the samanya remains discernable after its causal transformation into the
next tattva: the general is specified but does not dissolve in specification.
This also implies, that aviiesa (as the tanmdtra) are not necessarily beyond
perception; to the contrary, as both the YD passage quoted above and yBh
ad YS 3.47 testify.35 While the YD seems to be closer to the discussions in
NBh and PDS, the YBh offers a different explanation: perceptible objects
(called dravya ad YS 3.44 and grahya ad YS 3.47) are aggregates of
sdmdnya and viSesa. What this is supposed to mean can be shown by taking
up the example of the earth: The author of the YBh accepts that the earth,
while having "smell" (gandha) as tanmatra, shares as the last element all
the qualities (guna) of the other tanmqtra. Smell as tanmatra is unspecified,
it is smell in general, whereas the element earth is always manifest as an
object of perception with a concrete smell (as such the earth as an object 
-
grahya 
- 
is also a combination of sdmanya and viiesa according to YBh ad
YS 3.47). Nevertheless, smell as the causal matrix remains present in all
specifications, as the very smell which is specified. On the next level, the
author ascribes to earth a svarüpa or samdnya of her own: mürti (shape,
form). This svarupa seems to be different from the samdnya-viSesa
relationship between tanmAtra and mqhabhüta, as it is that feature of earth,
which allows for its recognition in diverse objects (dravya): It is
maintained, that wherever there is shape, there is earth; and with regard to
this, the specific appearance of form, its weight etc. are mere qualifications,
34 For the reference to Patafrjali compare HALBFASS (1992: 106, Note 8) and
BRONKHORST (1994: 318, Note l8).
35 Cf. BnourcloRsT (1994: 312, especially note 8), who refers to SK 34, in which it is
stated, that both, the viiesa and the aviiesa are the objects of the buddhindriya.
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which might change. As long as form remains perceptible, earth is present
in a dravya. Thus, the manifestation of the elements is connected with the
sdmdnya-viiesa terminology in two ways: First, the elements appear as
specifications of the unspecified, general tanmdtra; second, with regard to
their aggregation as objects (dravya) they remain discernable as samanya,
i.e. in their essential form (svarüpa) although they are in the configurations
of qualities undergo change.
This might account for the double-sidedness not only of the elements
in their appearance as configurations of qualities but also of the tanmatra as
the preceding causes. They are stable and relative at the same time, because
their status is defined with regard to the preceeding tattva. Thus, in
interpreting the division of the stages of guna-transformation, the causal
hierarchy has to be taken into account: It provides the respective
configurations with a certain stability according to their rank and as long as
this rank is kept. Another consequence of this way to describe causality in
terms of sdmdnya and vißesa is, that the cause, which functions as the
samanya with regard to its specifications might reappear on the next stage
as its own specification. Thus, the "substantialist" aspect of the satkarya-
doctrine can be accounted for by embedding it in the causal hierarchy of
Sämkhya; at the same time an entity can, according to its rank, be defined
as a changeable configuration of qualities.
2.2 Samanya and viiesa in proofs for pradhdna
The usage of samanya and viSesa for describing "internal" differences in the
causal realm of pralcrti is also connected with another implication of the
satkarya-thesis in combination with the doctrine of pralvti: On the one hand
the effect is explained as the result of a parindma of pralvti, who is able to
appear as her own effect, i.e. as something which is different but still
herself. On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish pralvti as a
singular, common causal realm from her manifest existence. This makes it
necessary to dehne the difference, which is implied in the causal
relationship, in such a way that the continuity between cause and effect can
be maintained, and even more: can be stressed. Seen from this angle, the
qualification samdnya mediates between the poles of "identity" and
"difference" as it indicates the possibility of differenciation, and thus,
similarity-cum-difference. The interpretation of causal activity as
636 ANGELIKA MALINAR
differenciation makes it possible to view the products as viiesa, which
depend on a preceeding sdmdnya. This interpretation has also consequences
for the attempts of proving pralvti as the existent cause of all manifest
things: This common cause is inferred by the general or common
characteristics (samanyato dy;!am), which have been observed in the
different manifest things (bheda).
If one scrutinizes the proofs presented quite comprehensively in the
Nyäg,'u the following connection between this interpretation and the type
of proof chosen for the inference of pralvti (the iesavat sdmdnyato dy;lam
anumdnam) can be observed: As all manifest products are, according to the
satkarya doctrine, related to the cause (i.e. to the previous state of the
causal powers), they display certain characteristics, which indicate the
presence of the cause in the effect. These characteristics have to be the same
in all effects, if one aims at proving that they all have a common singular
cause. Thus, if one has to infer a common cause for all effects, one has to
show, that the fact, that e.g. all manifest beings can be classified according
to species, can only be explained, if one assumes that they have a common
cause. Consequently, Sämkhya teachers used such general characteristics of
the effects as reasons (hetu) for infering a cause like that. Correspondingly,
the hetus listed in SK 15 as operative in proofs for prakrti are such
characteristics of the effects: They are limited Qtarimanat), they are
generically related with each other (samanvaya), their efficiency depends
on their capacity (iaktitah pravrtteh) etc. Seen from this perspective, the
creation of proofs to be classified as "iesqvat sdmdnyato dy;lam
anumdnaffi",37 presumably by Värsagalya, for infening pralvti gains some
36 Although the Nyäg seems to be quite authentic in its presentation of the contents of
non-Jaina philosophical systems, sometimes Simhasüri presents the proofs as if to lay
open the difficulties, which are implied in them (thus, for example, when he presents
the whole scheme of sämkhyistic cosmology as the example for the hetu "paimänät").
A critique might also be implied in the "gap", which time and again appears in each
proof, when the inference of a singular cause, the pradhana fails.
37 Contrary to NyS 1.1.5, in which a "threefold inference" (trividham anumdnam) is
taught, Varsagalya sets up a two-fold classification of anumana as (l) viiesato
dy;lam and (2) sdmdnyato d1,;!am. The second type is subdivided into pürvavad- and
iesavad-qnumdna. The latter allows for proving entities "beyond the sensual powers"
(atrndriya) and can be carried out as "direct" (vlta) and "indirect" (avita). Cf.
FRALTwALLwEn (1958: 46-47). For a discussion of this classification and its
connection with the seven "constant relations" (saptasambandha), which might serve
as a basis for inference, cf. MeLrNnn (1998, ch.5).
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plausibility: It might have been a designation for a special type of
inference, which had to be created for proving a type of cause like
,'pralcrti": One could not use a specific effect for tracing a specific cause, as
it is done in "ordinary" iesavad anumdnA,3s rather, one had to use
characteristics, which were postulated as being common to all causal
relationships in order to trace a "common cause". Therefore it is claimed:
(1) that all manifest things are effects, (2) that these effects have general
characteristics, and (3) that these characteristics result from their being
differenciations, i.e. formations of a common cause.
This kind of proof is not detailed in the SK, although one can trace
this line of argument if one analyses the arrangement of the karika,
especially the connection between SK 9 and 15. Neglecting this aspect in
the present discussion, I shall exemplify these observations by tuming to the
second hetu listed in SK 15 "bhedanam samanvaydt"'. Prakrti exists,
because individual things are causally (i.e. generically) related to each
other. By means of this hetu it is asserted that pralcrti is the unmanifest
cause, because manifest things are bound together as cause and effect
(anvaya or samanvaya, both appear in the text of Nyäg), which means in
this context, they always belong to a certain species. This interpretation is
given in the Nyäg, where this proof for pralcrri is presented in some detail.
The gist of the proof is to infer prakrti as the only genus (iati), i.e. the only
cause, from the observable fact that manifest things share the same species,
if they are related to each other as cause and effect. The text runs as
follows:
There exists a main cawe Qtradhana) lfor all manifest things], because a causal
[generic] relationship between individual things is perceived. It is observed that
individual things, which exist as cause and effect [for each other], are [generically]
related to each other because [they share] the same genus (ekajatisamanvaya). As
for example the sandalwood-tree and the piece of sandalwood. Thus it has been
taught, that individual things depend on [something] common.3e
The argument is then shifted to the context of the guna-doctrine: The
perception of generic relationships is the basis for tracing the common
38 If one follows the first of two definitions of iesavad anumdna in NBh ad NyS 1.1.5.
39 asti pradhdnam bhedanam anvayadariandt, adhyatmikanam bhedanam knrya-
karanatmakanam ekajatisamanvayo drsta iti candanaiaknladidrstantam val<syati I
sdmanyapürvakandm ca bhedqnam ity [.-.]. (Nyäg 314,7-10).
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origin of all things back to the ekajati, the one and only genus of the gurla.
As the reason (hetu) for this inference functions the observation, that all
manifest things have a similar efficiency, as they produce invariably
happiness, suffering and indifference.o0 Thus, the three gurya are proposed
as the ekajati, the common cause of all things, which can still be traced in
the effects in the same way as one can identify a piece of wood as
belonging to one tree-species or the other. The individual is thus (1) as a
representative of a species and (2) as producing invariably pleasure, pain
and indifference identifiable as a product of pralvti, i.e. as a specification
of her causal powers. Pralvti is sdmanya, because she is the ekajali, which
unfolds into distinct genera and species. Conversely, the variety of manifest
things can only be explained by postulating a general, a common jati,
which unfolds and appears as this ordered manifoldness. Thus,
(sam)anvaya, as generic relationship is postulated as a general characteristic
of all individual beings, and therefore can be used to infer pralvti as the
common cause. Correspondingly, pralcrti is proved to be a cause, whose
mode of production is in itself "(sam)anvaye". That is to say: Whatever
prakrtt produces appears as being stamped by the characteristics of a
species. Thus, sdmdnya and jati are in Sämkhya first and foremost not
defined as a specific formation of elements,4r but as a general causal
efficiency, which becomes manifest in a sequence of effects. Samanya
serves to qualify the causal realm and allows for describing the transition
from sdmdnya to viiesa as a specification of the former, in which the causal
power as the specified samdnya remains present and discernable.a2
This function of qualifying pradhana and its effects as sdmanya and
viiesa respectively is corroborated by the indirect (avtta)43 proof, in which
pralvti is infered through a refutation of alternative explanations. These
proofs have fortunately also been preserved by Simhasüri.aa As already
40 ekajatisamanvayapradariandrthasukhaditrigunaikajatisamanvayam käryatmakanam
i11a
43
44
tat sanniveSaviiesatvam (Nyäg 3 I 4,8-9).
For a discussion of this explanation in contrast to the interpretation offered in NyS
2.67-69 and in the commentaries compare MRttNen (1998: 156-16l).
This is also conoborated in the summary of Simhasüri's account of the proofs for
pralvti, where samanya is listed as that qualification of pralvti, which corresponds to
the observable samanvayc-relations in the manifest world (cf. Nyäg p.320,6-7).
On avlta and avlta see the paper of Eli FneNCo in the present volume.
These indirect inferences do not appear in SK and are only briefly refened to in YD ad
SK 6 (p. 106,17-107,10). Viewed from what has been transmitted in the Nyäg, one
4l
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indicated, in an indirect proof the necessity of pradhana as an existent
cause, and of qualifying it as sdmdnya is demonstrated ex negativo. It is
argued, that, if one does not postulate a general or common cause, it is not
possible to explain difference. This is ascertained through a refutation of
the opposite position. The opponent asserts that effects arise from
something, which does not or no longer exist. This is denied by pointing to
an unwelcomed implication Qtrasanga) of this thesis, the so-called
ekatvaprasanga, i.e. the false implication of identity of all things: If a non-
existent (asat) is the cause, then everything should be the same, because no
qualifications or distinctions can be ascribed to something non-existent or to
non-existence as such. Therefore, all manifest beings should be nirviiesa,
without differences. This is obviously not the case as there are differences
everywhere. These can, however, only exist as such, when something
general precedes or produces them and then remains with them as that,
which is common to them, as their samanya. Thus, as in the direct proof, it
is again stated: s dmdny apürv aknn ad vii e s andm.as
These observations on the functions of using the terms "samdnya" and
"viiese" in the context of proving pralvti, shall be supplemented by
pointing to a "theoretical gap". This gap increases the difficulties already
implied in the proofs discussed beforea6: Not only in the proofs for pralwti,
but also in explanations of the satkarya doctrine, it is the manifest world,
the world of effects, which is the exclusive point of reference. Thus, the
proofs belong to the iesavat samdnyato d1'glam type of inference: They
prove a cause by starting from common characteristics of the effect, by
"wrapping back" the visibile into the invisible. However, as the deduction
can say that they are at least hinted at in the two negative hetu in SK 9 (asadakarandt
and sarvasambhavdbhavat). As all indirect proofs presented by Simhasuri aim at
proving the thesis "pradhdnam karanam" by refuting the opposite position "asal
karanam" through prasanga, one might say that the indirect prooß are, basically,
variations of the first (negative) hetu of SK 9. Nevertheless, this does not make up for
the loss or the suppression of these proofs in what lSvarakrsla presents as the
"abstracted" version of what he refers to as "Sastitantra".
yadi vyaktasyasata utpattir yonyabhdvad ekntvaprasangak, pradhanabhavat
samdnyamatram idam vyahary nirviiesam ity etat prasajyeta I kasmat ? sdmdnva-
pürttakanad vilesanam, samanyapürvakö hi loke vi$esd drctqk / $yäg 321,10-13).
The major difficulty is, that the common characteristics of effects could be used for
infering several common causes, but not necessarily a singular and permanent
cofilmon causal realm.
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of the effect from the cause has been declared as unreliable (vyabhicara)
from quite early times, the Sämkhya teachers did not care for proving their
unique cause by postulating for example "causal laws", by taking up
research in the realm of pralcrti in order to make the "unwrapping", the
(predictable) evolution of the effects from the cause a strong argument for
pralcrti's existence. This lack of interest in the laws of natural agency,oT
which seems to be also a consequence of rejecting proofs of the effect from
the cause as unreliable, produced in the Sämkhya system the following
"theoretical gap"'. One can only explain the necessity of a concept and an
entity llke pralvti by postulating common and repeatable characteristics of
all effects, by maintaining for example that human beings have always been
and will be produced by human beings, in short by tracing cosmology back
to its cause. Therefore, the manifest world, which is produced time and
again, is always "complete". According to Sämkhya, no other tattva can
appear, there is no "open future" or an ever advancing evolution. The
Sämkhya teachers were, however, not in a position to explain this
completeness from the "being" of the cause, to explain, why there are only
14 genera. five elements etc. Instead, it was argued, that the common and
repeatable characteristics of manifest things can only be explained, if one
postulates a perrnanent, singular and common cause for them.
Nevertheless, to deal with "samanya" as a qualification of pralvti
might help to understand how pralqti as a concept as an entity is
constructed. It shows that the terminology of samdnya and viiesa is relevant
also in Sämkhya, especially when it serves to describe causal hierarchy. In
addition to this, the study of the systematic function of the pralcrti-concept
might help to answer the question, why other philosophical traditions as
Yoga accepted such a singular cause of the manifest world. In a pragmatic
perspective and with regard to the extant texts, one reason might be seen in
the advantages the concept offered for the requirements of the respective
school. As an example of such an advantage might serve the following
aspect of the description of yogic "success" (siddhi) or "state of power"
4i Onrr-e (1994: 148, Note 83) traces this absence of an experimental approach and
"Ursachenforschung" back to what he calls "Vergangenheitsorientierung" of the
anumdna-doctrine. The anumdna ftst and foremost tries to explain phenonema,
which are felt to deserve explanation, by placing them in already accepted frames of
reference or contexts of knowledge. 
- 
In the case of Sämkhya, the disinterest in
accounting for pralcrti's agency is also a consequence of defining her activity as being
teleologically bound to the "purpose of thepuruse".
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(aiivarya): The definition of pralvti as a singular and nevertheless common
cause makes it possible to explain yogic "SucceSS" as the power over the
productivity of nature, which is common to all victorious Yogins, which
might also influence destructive or creative processes in the manifest world
(as in the case of yogic manifestations of gods). At the same time the
display of yogic power indicates the entanglement with the world and as
such the distance from kaivalya. The latter aspect results in rejecting the
acquisition of aisvaryo as an aim in itself. On the other hand, there seems to
be no way to avoid the siddhis during the yogic conquest of the prakrti
(pl.). Therefore, it is, at least in YBh, interpreted as a "test" for the
detachment of the Yogin. Insight in the productivity of pralvtt is only
ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated
as aiivarya. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency
and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of
individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of "natural",
präkrtic possibilities: Thus, they can appear for example as Narasimha by
creating a specific alrangement of generically bound "forms", but they
would not create a sixth element or a "new" universe. Correspondingly,
yogic conquest of natural powers can, because of their being samanya, be
observed by other inhabitants of the universe. However, neither gods nor
Yogins shared their insight into these powers by giving a philosophical or
theoretical discourse on natural agency.
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